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Introduction 
 
Tax increment financing (TIF) is a mechanism authorized by Iowa law allowing 
local governments, primarily cities, to capture the taxes collected on property 
valuation growth in a specified district.  The incremental taxes are intended to be 
used for one or more of the following:  bond payments on borrowing required to 
prepare the district for development; rebates on taxes to developers meeting 
specific, albeit locally determined, criteria; direct spending by the local 
government to develop an area; or outright tax refunds to qualifying 
developments.  The use of TIF authority among Iowa’s cities is extremely 
popular.  In fiscal 1991, there were 746 different TIF districts or projects in Iowa.  
By fiscal 1997 that number had increased to 1,014, and by fiscal 2006, it had 
increased to 2,358, a 133 percent increase in a nine year period.  More cities are 
using TIF authority, there are many more TIF projects than there were a decade 
ago, and the amount of statewide property taxable valuation that is sequestered 
within TIF districts and therefore not available to the general funds of all local 
governments has also grown strongly over the years.    
 
There are different perspectives on the utility and the propriety of using TIF 
authority as liberally as it has been applied in Iowa.  It is widely considered by 
researchers studying this topic that Iowa has one of the most lenient and 
lucrative statutes for TIF usage in the U.S.  First, Iowa TIF users are not required 
to negotiate their use of the increments with other governments – increments are 
declared and spent unilaterally, mostly by city governments.  Second, Iowa is a 
property tax dependent and, comparatively, property-rich state – the local 
revenue yield off of TIFs is great.  Lastly, there are virtually no effective state or 
local oversight mechanisms of TIF usage by cities, counties, and other authorities 
in the state. 1 
 
                                                 
1 Many states require that affected local governments be notified and subsequently approve the TIF 
proposal.  In others, TIF proposals are reviewed by an independent state or regional authority as to their 
appropriateness and to determine whether the funds are, in fact, instrumental in enticing new economic 
activity.  Most states set clear limits on the duration of TIFs, limit the ability of localities to “roll-over” 
TIFs, and require annual financial reporting.  Iowa mandates none of these. 
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Many city officials view TIF authority as the primary mechanism for leveraging 
business development in their communities, and as such, it has become the chief 
economic development tool for many cities.  Of late, counties have also begun to 
use TIF authority for rural housing development and for large rural industries 
like ethanol plants.   
 
Others might counter that TIF authority is used somewhat indiscriminately 
among many cities (and now counties) resulting in the distribution of beneficial 
infrastructure investments and lucrative tax breaks to firms that did not need 
them.  Some contend, too, that TIF authority has been used by cities, in the main, 
to preemptively capture tax growth that would have occurred otherwise, and has 
allowed those cities, primarily booming suburban growth centers, to use this 
largess to further enhance their development prospects vis a vis their regional 
competition.   
 
During the 2003 Iowa General Assembly, legislators held several meetings on the 
topic of economic development tools, and specifically addressed questions of TIF 
use and potential abuse.  Revealed during these proceedings was a dearth of 
information about much of TIF use in Iowa, in particular, the amount of debt 
associated with TIF districts in the state, the kind of debt, the duration of the 
debt, and overall, the kinds of projects that benefited from this authority.   State 
secondary data compilations do not allow for an inquiry into the kinds of firms 
that benefit from TIF authority – those assessments must be done at the local 
government level and involve research of both city and county government 
finances.   
 
We can, however, characterize TIF use among all users using data compilations 
aggregated at the city or county level, by type of property classification, and the 
regional propensity to use TIF authority.  We can also compare TIF outcomes 
with other demographic or economic outcomes in Iowa.  This report will examine 
the kinds of counties and the kinds of communities that are “winning” and 
“losing” with regard to their utilization of TIF authority over the fiscal 1997 to 
2006 period measured in this report.2,3 
                                                 
2 A note on the main comparison period of fiscal 1997 through 2006.  There were several 
amendments to TIF authority during the mid 1990s.  TIF authority was allowed for housing 
construction, at first only for low and moderate income housing, and then later for any kind of 
housing.  As a result, TIF housing projects emerged in many places across Iowa.  TIF authority 
now extends to county governments, as well, as they increase their presence in promoting 
economic growth.  Also during this period there were important changes in how some industrial 
and commercial properties were subject to property taxation.  In particular, the Iowa General 
Assembly phased out the tax on manufacturing machinery and equipment, the M & E tax, which 
constituted a significant portion of the “increment” in many TIF districts in Iowa.  The benchmark 
of fiscal 1997 (based on valuations established in January 1995) allows us to capture much of the 
before and after effects of these changes.  Finally, although recent data suggested that the rapid 
increases in TIF utilization may have reached a plateau as TIF valuations as a percentage of all 
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The Evolution of TIF Authority in Iowa 
 
TIF authority in Iowa has evolved over time.  Early TIF authority focused on 
remedying urban blight and slums.  These programs were designed to address, 
primarily, inner-metropolitan city issues.  Later, in Iowa, TIF authority was 
extended beyond economic or social necessity into the area of economic 
development.  Urban blight and the attendant economic, social, or cultural 
maladies that concentrate in those areas was no longer the justification for this 
extraordinary use of public funds.  Later still, the Iowa General Assembly 
extended TIF authority into the area of housing.  
 
Urban Renewal TIF 
 
Much has been written about TIF origins and their evolution in Iowa.4  Tax 
increment financing emerged conceptually and practically during the late 1950s 
and 1960s as a mechanism for self-financing urban renewal projects that were 
“blighted” or, as was the case in Iowa’s urban renewal law, 
 
… constitute a serious and growing menace, injurious to the public 
health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the state; that the 
existence of such areas … constitutes an economic and social liability 
imposing onerous municipal burdens which decrease the tax base and 
                                                                                                                                                 
valuations and real tax collections from TIF leveled off for a couple of years, preliminary data for 
fiscal 2007 indicate a sharp increase in TIF valuations. 
 
3 A note on all property tax data used in this analysis.  Information on city, county, school district, 
and other property tax collections are collected and compiled annually by the Iowa Department of 
Management.  Historical data were generally only available on computer tape or in hard form and 
were compiled ad hoc by the author.  In recent years, a significant and growing amount of 
property tax information is available on-line at the State of Iowa web site.  This includes highly 
detailed information about TIF property classifications by city for recent fiscal years.  Alas, such 
detail has not been compiled for past years making highly detailed, city specific analyses difficult.  
Additional information can be found in the annual reports on state and local government finance 
that are compiled by the Iowa Legislative Services Bureau.  Additional information and guidance 
not generally available on-line were provided by staff members of the Iowa Department of 
Management and the Legislative Services Bureau.  While these agencies provided much of the 
data, all further processing was done by the authors who are ultimately responsible for their 
accuracy and the conclusions drawn from the data. 
 
4 See, for example,  Peter S. Fisher and Charles Bruner, “Tax Increment Financing in Iowa: What Should 
be Done?”, Iowa Policy Project, April 2003; Dave Swenson and Liesl Eathington, “Do Tax Increment 
Financing Districts in Iowa Spur Regional Economic Growth?”, Department of Economics, Iowa State 
University, June 2002; and, in response to the previous paper, Mark Edelman, an extension economics 
professor and Boone housing developer offered his views in “Appraisal Comments on Tax Increment 
Financing Effectiveness in the Context of Evaluating Iowa Tax Policy Alternatives,” Community Vitality 
Center, Iowa State University, February 2003. 
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reduce tax revenues, [and] substantially impairs or arrests the sound 
growth of municipalities ….5    
 
TIF originally was a mechanism for infusing a substantial amount of public 
investment into a region.  It allowed the authorizing body, the city, to retain all of 
the taxes on the property value increments that accumulated to an urban renewal 
area.  In effect it allowed the community to keep all of the increment in property 
taxes that would have gone to the city, the county, the school district and all of 
the other governmental authorities that had taxing power and use those tax 
collections to pay off all of the local-government investment costs (secured 
through borrowing) incurred to make the area desirable for development.  The 
rationale was that, for a period of time, all local governments would forgo 
increased tax collections from the development that would not have occurred 
without the direct intervention of the city.  Once the development costs were paid 
off, all districts would benefit from an enriched tax base.    
 
The normative authorization for this kind of intervention or involvement in the 
private sector derives from welfare economic principles that demonstrate where 
governments have an obligation to address market failures.  In blighted or 
otherwise dilapidated areas, there is a valid argument that property owners will 
systematically under-invest in property because their ability to earn reasonable 
returns on their investments is eroding.  The area is not desirable enough from an 
economic, social, spatial or other point of view to generate the kind of investment 
necessary to maintain or improve property values.   
 
When we count all of the public costs of urban renewal efforts and compare them 
to all of the economic plusses that may accrue over time, we may actually be able 
to, within this circumscribed territory, isolate both net economic and fiscal 
benefits accruing  to the residents in the targeted area and the sponsoring 
community at-large.  Over a considerable period of time the region may begin to 
produce tax receipts that represent a net increase over all public finance costs and 
all increments to public service costs; however, this may not be the case in all 
urban renewal regions.  It is important to point out that such calculations are 
incredibly difficult to make and in many, if not most, cases highly arbitrary.   
 
Beyond the net economic and fiscal outcomes, renewal efforts in the region may 
yield sets of social and community advantages that can outweigh raw economic or 
fiscal gains.  Examples might include lower unemployment, new commercial 
activity, lower crime and other social problems, and neighborhood or community 
social stability.  According to Fisher and Bruner (2003) and our previous work 
(2001) it is very difficult to get a handle on the overall effectiveness of TIF 
projects in Iowa as there have been no systematic controlled studies of urban 
renewal TIFs to date. 
                                                 
5 Chapter 403.2(1) Code of Iowa, 2004. 
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Economic Development TIF 
 
Beginning in the mid 1980s, cities in Iowa were granted the authority to treat 
economic development as an essential municipal (corporate) purpose.6  That 
meant cities could classify urban renewal economic development activities, per 
se, to be as important as other essential city purpose, just like public safety, 
maintenance of safe streets and other infrastructure, pollution control, and other 
essential health and welfare functions of local government.   The designation also 
meant that city officials could by a vote of affirmation create urban renewal areas, 
enter into debt agreements, and otherwise plan for economic development 
activities, although the law allows citizens to petition for an election regarding 
bonding for economic development.  These changes greatly changed the use of 
the authority for TIF in Iowa away from larger urban renewal efforts to smaller, 
project or firm-specific TIFs. 
 
The authority in economic theory for this use of public resources and local 
economic development action is much more tenuous than in the urban renewal 
case.  Outwardly, we are not dealing with specific, well-articulated market 
failures in most of the modern TIF uses.  Instead, communities of various sizes, 
circumstances, and prospects have come to utilize TIF authority as an economic 
development assistance mechanism irrespective of the original or emerging 
condition of the community or the needs of the firm or project that is in receipt of 
TIF investment.   Proponents of this practice must look beyond economic 
principles to justify the practice, to include: 
 
• The use of TIF authority enticed private investment that otherwise would 
have been indifferent to the community; 
 
• The TIF authority is being used to substantially change or diversify the 
local economic structure as part of a comprehensive effort to raise area 
standards of living, stabilize a community, or address important social 
issues like pervasive unemployment or underemployment; or 
 
• The TIF authority provides local investment “match” funds to be used to 
leverage state or federal aid.  
 
These reasons may make sense at the local government level, but they are 
difficult to justify using economic principles on several grounds.   
 
• There is little evidence to support the assertion that local incentives 
actually determine business locations.  In fact there is a growing amount of 
                                                 
6 See specifically, Chapter 384.24.3 of the Iowa Code where essential corporate purposes are enumerated 
and defined and distinguished from general corporate purposes. 
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research indicating the vast majority of businesses would have otherwise 
located in the “winning” jurisdiction, nonetheless; 
 
• There is also precious little evidence indicating that local economic 
development activities substantially alter overall regional economic 
opportunities – the ability of a community to influence broad economic 
factors is limited; and  
 
• Communities have many alternative economic development program 
abilities allowing them to substantially address business needs for 
infrastructure, to provide targeted and limited tax breaks, and to generate 
resources that might be used to leverage state or federal funds.  These 
include existing general obligation bonding authority, capital reserve 
funding, and itemized budgeted amounts for those purposes. 
 
• Finally, principles of intergovernmental fairness would question the 
legitimacy for taking other governments’ property tax collections in the 
name of economic development objectives. 
 
Many communities in Iowa have suffered from losses in downtown commercial 
activity, industrial re-location, and population stagnation or loss.  These factors, 
however, have much to do with long-standing and powerful urbanization forces 
and less to do with failing markets locally, regionally, or nationally.  Still, it is 
hard to argue to a declining community that their situation is not one of both 
economic and social necessity and that the use of public funds is not warranted. 
 
In fact, some of the greatest effort in terms of TIF use has been realized in these 
kinds of declining communities.  Unfortunately, and the subsequent research will 
bear this out, the “yield” on this effort locally is much less than for communities 
able to use the same authority piggy-backed on the (sub)urbanization effects that 
are clearly ongoing and evident in Iowa.  In short, our research suggests that TIF 
authority works best by a large margin in the state’s booming suburban and 
metropolitan communities and that it has had only lack-luster results at best 
among many of its struggling medium sized cities. 
 
Housing TIF 
 
The use of TIF authority for housing was first granted in 1996, with the allowance 
of all housing development and promotion specifically categorized in the Iowa 
code as an essential corporate purpose.  This meant that the governing 
authorities, city or county governments, could authorize housing TIF projects and 
indebtedness by affirmation instead of submitting the project to the public for 
approval via a super majority vote, as is required for, for example, general 
obligation bonds. 
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This authority was first limited to “the construction of housing for low and 
moderate income families,” but was, the next legislative session, amended to 
include all housing.7  As a result, the vast majority of TIF housing projects in 
Iowa to date are not designed to directly address low and moderate income 
housing needs.  The growth in this category has been robust.  In fiscal 1997, 
$222.5 million in residential taxable valuation was located within the state’s TIF 
districts.  By fiscal 2006, that value had climbed to $1.577 billion.  Not all of that 
valuation increase is due to TIF housing projects, but a large fraction is, and 
housing TIF utilization has become quite popular in Iowa. 
 
The use of TIF authority for housing does contain, however, a provision requiring 
the diversion of TIF revenues to support the housing needs of low and moderate 
income Iowans.8   
 
• For communities with populations of 15,000 or more, TIF housing 
revenues must be set aside for low and moderate income housing 
assistance in the amount matching the percentage of low and moderate 
income in community.  This amount is determined by the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) “section 8” housing 
guidelines, which qualify families for federal housing assistance.  These 
cities must divert a floor level of at least 10 percent of TIF housing 
revenues to low and moderate income programs. 
 
• Communities under 15,000 in population must also use HUD guidelines, 
but they are not required to establish a 10 percent minimum diversion of 
TIF funds. 
 
• Communities with populations of 5,000 or fewer need not provide any low 
and moderate income housing assistance provided they have completed a 
housing needs assessment following rules established by the Iowa 
Department of Economic Development that show the community does not 
have a need for low and moderate income housing. 
 
• Communities over 15,000 just limit their housing TIFs to 10 years; 
communities under 15,000 can extend the projects to 15 years. 
 
There is no statewide compilation of what constitutes percentages of low and 
medium income households in Iowa, nor is there any compilation documenting 
the total amounts diverted into housing TIF revenues nor the uses to which those 
funds may have been put.   It is very clear, however, that the vast majority of 
benefits of TIF housing incentives have accumulated to housing developers and 
generally middle to upper middle class home purchasers.  Housing TIF projects 
                                                 
7 Chapter 403.2(3) Iowa Code. 
8 See, in particular, Chapter 403.22 Iowa Code. 
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are also gaining popularity in the rural portions of Iowa, and have been used to 
develop rural, often resort-like, subdivisions by county governments, although 
the majority of valuation gains in the housing category have accumulated to 
metropolitan counties with much higher average incomes than rural areas.  There 
is scant evidence that housing TIFs have significantly influenced the availability 
of low and moderate income housing in the state. 
 
TIF Trends 
 
The evolution of TIF usage in Iowa can be documented with analysis of property 
tax collections and valuations over time.  This section details the growth in 
number of TIFs, TIF tax collections, and changes in TIF usage by type of 
property.  Most of the detailed information available for analysis of TIFs can only 
be analyzed cleanly at the county level.  The reason for this is that taxes collected 
within county borders must be certified by County Auditors.  Taxing districts of 
many types cross county boundaries.   The budget information is organized to 
reconcile at the county level, but not at any other level of government without 
extraordinary effort.  However, by analyzing these data over time, aggregated at 
the county level, we can identify the change in the number of TIF districts in 
total, the amount and kinds of taxable valuations contained in the districts, and 
the estimated property taxes that are yielded from those valuations.9  
 
There has been a sharp increase in the number and in the amount of incremental 
revenues captured with TIF districts or projects in recent years.  In fiscal 1990, 
property taxes revenues collected in all TIF projects or districts in Iowa 
amounted to less than 1 percent of all taxes collected.  Using inflation adjusted 
dollars, those taxes amounted to just under $20 million (see Figure 1).  By fiscal 
1997, TIF property tax revenue amounts had risen to 2.4 percent of all property 
tax collections, or, in real terms $68.6 million.  TIF revenues have increased, 
generally, since fiscal 1997; although there was a sharp reduction in TIF revenues 
in fiscal 2000 due to the phasing out of the manufacturing machinery and 
equipment property tax in Iowa.  A huge fraction of the property tax value in 
many TIF projects was industrial machinery and equipment, and the phase-out 
eliminated that portion of increment.  Cities, primarily, recovered rapidly and 
sharply increased TIF activity during the early part of the 2000s.  TIF revenues 
are estimated to be 5.7 percent of all property tax collections in fiscal 2006, or, in 
inflation-adjusted terms, $191.8 million.  As a fraction of property taxes collected, 
TIF revenues have increased by almost 240 percent since fiscal 1997.  The real 
gain in actual collections has been 280 percent. 
 
                                                 
9 The data set that we analyze identifies only the regular taxes that are collected by Iowa local governments 
from the regular tax bases and from the TIF districts.  The property taxes that are collected from TIF 
districts are estimated indirectly. 
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Figure 1 
TIF Taxes as a Percentage of All Property Taxes
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Growth in TIF valuations has been quite robust over the periods measured.  
Figure 2 demonstrates the difference in real, inflation adjusted growth in 
property values over the fiscal 1997 to 2006 period for all TIF districts and all 
other properties.  The state’s total non-TIF tax base realized real growth of 23 
percent, but the valuation in TIF districts grew by a full 200 percent.  The slowest 
non-TIF district growth was in residential values (due to the effects of residential 
valuation rollbacks), but over the period measured, residential increments grew 
by 503 percent, by far the fastest category of growth.  The most rapid non-TIF 
growth occurred in commercial values at 53 percent, but commercial TIF values 
grew more than 6 times as much, by 329 percent.  Real industrial TIF values, the 
kinds that most TIFs were originally designed to spark, grew the slowest among 
TIF classifications at 162 percent. 
 
Figure 2 
Real Taxable Valuation Changes by Property Classification, 
Fiscal 1997 to 2006, by TIF and All Other Districts
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23% 23%
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Much of Iowa’s modern property tax base is being channeled into TIF districts.  
Over a quarter of the new taxable property values in Iowa since fiscal 1997 is in 
TIF districts, and as Figure 3 demonstrates, the accumulation of TIF district 
valuation differs considerably across property classifications.  These data help us 
to see what fraction of new growth in the state’s tax base is finding its way into 
TIF versus all non-TIF valuations.   
 
For the state as a whole, over 27 percent of the real growth in the state’s tax base 
was in the restricted use TIF territories, although growth in the total state tax 
base was stemmed considerably by the elimination of the M & E values from the 
totals.  Among all industrial properties, that growth was 42 percent, and among 
commercial properties that growth was 25 percent.  Twelve percent of new 
residential taxable valuations were contained in TIF districts. 10  
 
Figure 3 
Real TIF Taxable Valuation Changes by Property Class as 
Percentages of Total Valuation Changes, Fiscal 1997 to 2006
12.0%
25.1% 27.4%
42.0%
Residential Commercial Industrial Total
In TIF Districts In All Other Taxing Districts
 
 
TIF districts have been used primarily for promoting commercial property 
development in recent years, even though the standard justification is that TIF is 
primarily used to promote industrial growth.  Figure 4 illustrates the change in 
TIF taxable valuation accumulations, total valuations, and non-TIF values that 
have accrued since fiscal 1997.  The figure takes a little explaining.   At the outset, 
we are only comparing residential, industrial, and commercial property values, as 
these are the primary property classifications subject to TIF.  We are excluding 
                                                 
10 These bars add to more than 100 percent because of the elimination of the M&E properties from the 
state’s tax base. 
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agricultural, utility, and machinery and equipment categories as these values are 
typically not part of TIF districts or have been altered statutorily over the period 
measured.    
 
The first bar represents the distribution of values among this set of properties in 
fiscal 1997.   We use this as our benchmark.   Residential values were nearly 65 
percent, commercial values were, 29 percent, and slightly over 6 percent were 
industrial values.  The second bar illustrates the distribution of total property 
valuation growth among the three classifications.  Commercial valuation growth 
accounted for a greater fraction of the change than might have been suggested 
given its original share of the tax base in fiscal 1997.  Residential growth was a 
lower share, primarily due to the effects of residential rollback. 
 
Almost 60 percent of TIF growth in this set of properties was commercial, 12 
percent industrial, and 29 percent residential.  The commercial share of TIF was 
much higher than would have been expected using fiscal 1997 as the baseline.  
Another interesting fact is that the commercial share of growth is more than 5 
times the share of industrial growth in light of the common justification of TIF as 
a primary tool for enticing industrial growth.   
 
It is clear that TIF usage is significantly promoting general commercial 
development, and one must question how much of this development is in fact net 
new job growth in the Iowa economy.  Granted, expansions in, for example, 
insurance companies or other financial institutions may be considered both good 
jobs and beneficial to the remainder of the state’s economy.  Unfortunately it is 
impossible from this analysis or any other aggregate analysis to sort out 
commercial TIF growth that benefited a leading national banking operation or a 
major insurance company versus a Target, a Hy-Vee food store, or a Wal-Mart.11 
 
The amount of Iowa’s property tax base that is in TIF districts has grown rapidly 
over the years and now constitutes a sizable portion of the state’s tax base.  
Considering all rural and urban taxing jurisdictions, TIFs now contain 5.6 
percent of the state total tax base.  By fiscal 2006, the amount of taxable 
valuations in TIF districts in Iowa reached $5.955 billion, as shown in Table 1.12  
The largest fraction of TIF taxable values are commercial at 58.3 percent, 
followed, perhaps to the surprise of some, by residential at 26.5 percent and then 
industrial at merely 15 percent, even though TIFs are primarily justified locally as 
industrial job development tools.  Looking at the fraction of each category’s total 
valuation in TIF, we see that 18.6 percent of statewide industrial valuation is in a 
TIF district, followed by 13 percent of commercial values.  Just 3.4 percent of 
residential values are in a TIF district. 
                                                 
11 A separate question remains as to whether any of these major corporations were in need of public 
subsidy. 
12 Tentative data release by the Iowa Department of Management in March, 2006, sets Fiscal 2007 TIF 
values at $6.9 billion, more than a 15 percent increase over the Fiscal 2006 amount. 
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Figure 4 
Comparing the Composition of Tax Base Change, Fiscal 1997 
to 2006, with Tax Base Characteristics in Fiscal 1997
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Table 1 
Total Taxable Valuations by Property Classification for Fiscal 2006 
 
Category Total Valuation TIF Valuation
Percentage of 
total valuation
in TIF
Category share 
of all TIF 
valuation
Residential 46,852,676,935    1,576,898,029      3.4% 26.5%
Agricultural 20,722,572,967    19,761,345           0.1% 0.3%
Commercial 26,666,268,746    3,469,568,172      13.0% 58.3%
Industrial 4,767,607,189      888,369,414         18.6% 14.9%
All Other 8,091,852,511      100                       0.0% 0.0%
Total 107,100,978,348  5,954,597,060      5.6% 100.0%  
 
 
Where TIF Change is Occurring 
 
Table 2 allows us to differentiate many important changes in taxable valuation, 
TIF, and other social and economic indicators by type of county.  The data have 
been organized to control for metropolitan counties as defined by the Census, 
large urban counties – those with a central city under 50,000 but over 10,000 in 
population, and small urban and rural counties – those without a central city of 
10,000 or more.  This table highlights the range of outcomes that are evident over 
the years regarding TIF, population, and job growth. 
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Iowa’s metropolitan counties accounted for 29 percent of the TIF district or 
project growth over the period measured, yet yielded 60 percent of real TIF 
taxable valuation growth.  Over that period, they also realized 112 percent of 
population growth and 72 percent of jobs. 
 
In very sharp contrast, Iowa’s smaller counties accounted for 60 percent of TIF 
district or project growth, but 30 percent of statewide growth in real TIF district 
incremental values.  Though they realized 21 percent of the state’s job growth 
over this period, they found that they suffered a negative 8 percentage share of 
population growth.  Stuck in the middle, the large urban cities added 10 percent 
of the districts, received 10 percent of the real increment, 7 percent of the jobs, 
and a –4 percent of the total population growth. 
 
Table 2 
Summary of Shares of Changes of Selected Tax and Non-Tax  
Related Indicators, Fiscal 1997 to 2006 
 Metro  Large Urban 
 Small Urban 
and Rural 
TIF Districts / Projects 29% 10% 60%
TIF Taxable Valuations
Residential 50% 11% 39%
Commercial 70% 7% 24%
Industrial 36% 26% 39%
Total 60% 10% 30%
Populaton Growth, 1995 
to 2004 112% -4% -8%
Total Jobs 72% 7% 21%  
 
 
Another contrast is displayed in Figure 5.  Here we look at the comparative yield 
received by our different county groups on new TIF projects or districts.  The 
values were arrived at by dividing the total real accumulation in TIF values by the 
number of new districts that emerged in the different county groups.  Statewide, 
each new TIF district or project between fiscal 1997 and 2006 yielded an average 
of $3.17 million in incremental taxable value per project or district.  For metro 
areas, the average amount per new project or new district was $6.5 million in 
new base.  For the small urban and rural counties, the amount was $1.565 million 
per district, half the state average and less than a quarter of the value realized by 
the metropolitan districts.  The large urban districts yielded at the state average.  
The gains per district or project are disproportionately concentrated in the 
metropolitan areas. 
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Figure 5 
Real Change in Valuation Per New TIF District/Project, 
Fiscal 1997 to 2006
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TIF district property values grew by $1,370 per capita between fiscal 1997 and 
2006.  There are, however, very distinct areas of Iowa in which TIF valuation 
gains were greater than others.  These differences are displayed in Map 1.  Only 
26 counties grew at the statewide average or more, and the strongest growth was 
found along Interstate 80.  There were other pockets of strong growth, namely in 
northwest Iowa, but large and distinct segments of the state either posted real 
declines in their total TIF valuations or much smaller growth than the state 
average.  Dickinson County had the greatest real increase at $8,727 per capita, 
and Monroe County suffered a real loss of $5,717, primarily from the elimination 
of manufacturing and machinery and equipment from the tax base in the late 
1990s. 
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The fiscal and the economic development benefits of TIF utilization are highly 
localized in and around some of the state’s wealthiest and fastest growing 
counties.  Map 2 shows that TIF valuation is not equally distributed across Iowa.  
In particular, except for very high values in the resort and retirement area of 
Dickinson County, the counties with the highest amount of incremental 
valuation, a measure of economic success, are primarily clustered around the 
state’s major metropolitan cities.  In marked contrast, 43 of Iowa’s counties have 
TIF taxable values per capita that are less than half of the statewide average of 
$2,017.   
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Which Governments Receive TIF Revenues? 
 
Historically, cities were the main users of TIF authority and the main recipients 
of TIF receipts, as described in Chapter 403 of the Iowa Code.  Iowa’s community 
colleges were also major recipients of TIF receipts under authority found in 
Chapter 260E of the Iowa Code to provide job training and education services; 
their use of this authority has waned extensively in recent years in favor of other 
incentives provided under Iowa law.  Lately, county governments have begun to 
utilize TIF authority as have Rural Improvement Zones.13 
 
                                                 
13 Authority for rural improvement zones is contained in Chapter 357H of the Iowa Code.  As originally 
passed, this section allowed for the creation of these zones in counties that had a private lake development 
whose populations were between 10,500 and 11,500 in 1990.  Only four counties fit those extremely 
narrow limits, although it is apparent that the law was written with just one county in mind: Guthrie County 
which houses the Lake Panorama development.  Since, the Code has been changed to allow any county 
with a population of less than 18,500 to qualify. 
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Table 3 gives us several perspectives on which kinds of governments collect TIF 
revenues, how much revenues they are foregoing for their respective general 
funds, and the distributions of collections and losses. 
 
In fiscal 2006, $191.8 million in property tax revenues were accumulated under 
TIF authority.  City governments with TIF authority accounted for $181.64 
million of those collections, or nearly 95 percent.  County government claimed 
$8.01 million, or 4.2 percent, with rural improvement districts and community 
colleges, collectively, accounting for just 1.1 percent. 
 
Table 3 
Fiscal 2006 TIF Revenue Collections by Recipient 
 
Cities
Community 
Colleges Counties
 Rural 
Improvement 
Districts Total
Cities 62,005,720   302,709        717,338        -                   63,025,767   
Counties 33,862,684   159,612        2,620,695     453,683        37,096,674   
Community Colleges 3,754,368     19,436          202,386        34,911          4,011,101     
School Districts 74,008,358   344,405        4,000,651     567,690        78,921,104   
All Others 8,009,431     15,662          467,123        287,583        8,779,799     
Total 181,640,561 841,824        8,008,193     1,343,867     191,834,445 
Cities
Community 
Colleges Counties
 Rural 
Improvement 
Districts Total
Cities 32.3              0.2                0.4                -                   32.9              
Counties 17.7              0.1                1.4                0.2                19.3              
Community Colleges 2.0                0.0                0.1                0.0                2.1                
School Districts 38.6              0.2                2.1                0.3                41.1              
All Others 4.2                0.0                0.2                0.1                4.6                
Total 94.7              0.4                4.2                0.7                100.0            
Source:  All data from Iowa Department of Management property tax files.  Subsequent analysis by Iowa 
Legislative Services Bureau staff.
 Dollar Value of TIF Revenue Collections by TIF Authority and Taxing Jurisdiction
Percentage of TIF Revenue Collections by TIF Authority and Taxing Jurisdiction
Taxing 
jurisdiction
TIF Authority
Taxing 
jurisdiction
TIF Authority
 
 
Table 3 is also instructive because it gives us an idea of the value of potential 
general fund property taxes that are diverted into TIF districts receipts.  Of the 
$191.8 million in total TIF collections, $74.01 million, or 41.1 percent,  are based 
on school district levies, $62.01 million, nearly 33 percent, are attributable to the 
 18
city portion of consolidated levies applied to TIF districts and projects, and $33.9 
million, 19.3 percent, come from county levies. 
 
On a net exchange basis, that is, the amount received via TIF versus the amount 
foregone, cities are the only entities with a positive amount.  For every dollar in 
general fund revenues paid by cities into TIF authorities in Iowa, they receive two 
dollars in property taxes from all other taxing authorities – or 200 percent more 
than they contribute.   
 
How Are TIF Revenues Used? 
 
Originally, urban development TIF districts borrowed money against future tax 
collections (the increment) to fund improvements.  The property tax increment 
paid the debt service.  Many used a mix of short-term and long-term borrowing 
against future increments as development often occurred in stages.  Over the 
years, city officials developed different and creative uses of TIF receipts.  Rather 
than obligating the city to debt payments, many cities have used TIF receipts on a 
project by project basis as a reimbursement to businesses or developers who put 
in necessary infrastructure or to compensate them for other development-related 
costs.   That reimbursement pledge is considered a debt obligation for the TIF city 
even though it is not the traditional government bonding or borrowing type of 
obligation.   Other strategies include using TIF receipts as reimbursements to a 
firm for meeting certain hiring targets within specified time periods.  Finally, for 
many new TIF projects typically involving a single firm, the incremental TIF 
property taxes are paid by the new firm but then promptly returned as a de facto 
property tax rebate.  In all of these more creative uses of TIF revenues, the 
obligation to the firm, either for infrastructure, job creation, or as a tax 
abatement is treated as a contractual obligation to the firm; hence, for legal 
purposes we are assured by cities and by bond counsel that they are also 
considered debt within the meaning of the original legislation. 
 
A recent study by the Legislative Services Agency of the State of Iowa reports a 
host of statistics about TIF activity among the cities and counties in Iowa.  One 
important table lists the outstanding obligations associated with TIF activity 
among the many cities and the counties using this authority.  These values are 
contained in Table 4.  The cities and the counties reported $1.6 billion in 
cumulative outstanding debt obligations associated with the TIF districts that 
were in existence in fiscal 2005.  Of that total, slightly more than 2/3rds were 
pledged for bond payments, 21 percent for tax rebates, and the remainder for 
other project obligations. 
 
There are questions as to whether these filings by the cities and the counties 
represent their current and future debt obligations accurately or whether there 
are differing definitions of debt.  As the next small section will demonstrate, 
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however, it is probably not wise to assume that the property taxes that are 
collected in Iowa are used in the manners and proportions suggested in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Amount in Millions 
Percent of 
Total
Bond Payments 1082.2 67.5%
Non-Bond Loans 43.7 2.7%
Self-Financed Activity 123.8 7.7%
Tax Rebates 338.4 21.1%
Other Project Obligations 15.4 1.0%
Total 1603.5 100.0%
Reported Outstanding TIF Obligations, Fiscal 2005
Source: Legislative Services Bureau, Tax Increment Financing Outstanding Obligations 
Report - 2005  
 
 
 A Profile of Two TIF Cities 
 
An illustration is in order.  We will describe the TIF characteristics of two Iowa 
cities: City A, a medium sized Iowa city, and City B, a much larger place.   In fiscal 
1997, 2.4 percent of the tax base in City A was contained in an active TIF district.  
By fiscal 2006, that fraction had grown to 6.8 percent.   In City B, TIF accounted 
for 3.6 percent of the total tax base in fiscal 1997 and 8.5 percent in fiscal 2006.  
Both cities obviously had very sharp increases in TIF district valuations.   
 
Figure 6 demonstrates the inflation adjusted growth in their respective tax bases.  
In City A, real TIF valuations grew by 183 percent, total valuations including TIF 
grew by just 1 percent, and the valuation available for local government general 
fund taxation declined by 1 percent.  In City B, real total valuation increased by 9 
percent, TIF valuation by 156 percent, and the general fund tax base by 4 percent.  
 
It is clear that the net accumulation in the communities’ property tax bases have 
been highly concentrated in their TIF areas and that their remaining tax bases, 
those available for the general fund of all other municipal services, have not 
demonstrated such robust growth.   
 
The net real positive gains in total taxable valuations in both cities, meager as 
they are, would indicate that the cities and all affected local governments should 
be in better shape as a consequence of the recent growth.  A second closer look, 
however, would inform the reader that the tax base upon which City A must rely 
to pay for ongoing general city government operations has declined, while City B 
values did grow, but by just 4 percent.  As the valuation in the TIF district is 
intended to be used solely to satisfy economic development-related debt 
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obligations and other economic development activities, that robust largess is not 
available to the cities general funds, at least within the spirit of the legislation 
that created and amended TIF authority in Iowa.  So, the taxpayers in the non-
TIF territories of the cities may either pay higher tax rates or receive lower city 
services as a result of the shrinking or slowly growing general fund tax bases.  In 
addition, that real general fund tax base erosion or slow growth also affected all 
other taxing authorities relying upon it, most notably county government and the 
local school districts.  The property taxes collected on the rapidly growing 
increments in the TIF areas are retained exclusively by City A and by City B to 
pay for economic development indebtedness and related economic development 
activity within the district. 
 
Figure 6 
Real Change in Taxable Values by Taxing District, 
Fiscal 1997 to 2006
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The next question in this demonstration is basic:  how were TIF revenues used in 
City A and City B?   
 
The Iowa code explicitly tells us how they are supposed to be used: 
 
[The taxes collected on the increment] … shall be allocated to and when 
collected be paid into a special fund of the municipality to pay the 
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principal of and interest on loans, moneys advanced to, or indebtedness, 
whether funded, refunded, assumed, or otherwise … incurred by the 
municipality to finance or refinance, in whole or in part, an urban 
renewal project within the area …. 
 
When such loans, advances, indebtedness, and bonds, if any, and interest 
thereon, have been paid, all moneys thereafter received from taxes upon 
the taxable property in such urban renewal areas shall be paid into the 
funds for the respective taxing districts in the same manner as taxes on 
all other property.  Chapter 403.19(2) of the Code of Iowa. 
 
The code contains two specific and seemingly unambiguous statements regarding 
the collection and use of TIF revenues: (1) the property taxes collected in TIF 
districts are to be used to “pay off loans, moneys advanced to, or indebtedness” 
associated with the TIF district; and (2) the amounts not needed to pay debt costs 
are to be released back to “the respective taxing districts in the same manner as 
taxes on all other property.”  A literal reading of that would mean that the 
amount of valuation not needed to pay for indebtedness in the year for which the 
debt is due must be released for use by all affected taxing districts’ general funds. 
 
We can track some of this spending by looking at the communities’ Fiscal 2005 
Comprehensive Financial Reports.  These accounts are displayed in Table 5 and 
are presented as spending per $1,000,000 of TIF revenues collected so that the 
cities’ identities remain anonymous.   From those reports, we find that City A said 
it made debt principle and interest payments totaling $450,000 per million of 
TIF collections.  City B made $581,000 in debt payments per million in TIF 
revenues.  That leaves large fractions of their collections for non-debt uses in 
both cities.  In percentage terms, City A still had 55 percent of its collections 
available after debt payments, and City B had 42 percent.   
 
City B used 44 percent of its total TIF collections for non-debt uses that were 
unspecified – a value slightly higher than its actual collections in Fiscal 2005 – 
thus exhausting all of its TIF receipts in the year that they were collected.  City A 
specified the use of 7.6 percent of the total, and spent another 29 percent for 
unspecified uses.  Carrying forward TIF receipts from a previous year, plus the 
unspent collections from Fiscal 2005, City A ended up with $268,900 in unspent 
collections per original $1,000,000 collected in TIF property taxes.  This money, 
according to a city officer, was placed in a capital reserve fund for future uses.   
 
In the case of these cities, several questions emerge.  First, precisely how do the 
cities spend, in this case the 29 percent to 44 percent of their TIF revenues that 
are characterized as unspecified transfers out?  Are they spent for roads, 
buildings, infrastructure, or amenities?  Are they deposited into general fund type 
accounts where their uses are fungible and difficult to track?  Are they allocated 
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to activities that are clearly or not clearly identified as economic development 
related projects?   
Table 5 
TIF Uses Per $1,000,000 in Receipts, Fiscal 2005 
 
City A City B
All Debt 449,764         580,829            
Debt principle 341,329         317,781            
Debt interest 108,435         263,048            
Debt as a percent of revenues 45% 58%
Other spending (specified) 76,730           -                    
 Transfer out (unspecified non 
debt service uses) 293,115         440,673            
 Unspecified transfers out as a 
percent of revenues 29% 44%
Remainder 180,391         (21,502)             
Beginning fund balance 88,481           6,803                
Ending balance 268,872         (14,699)             
 Ending balance as a percent of 
revenues 27% -1%
 Source: Each city's Fiscal 2005 Comprehensive Financial Report 
Expenditure Per $1,000,000 of TIF Revenues
 
 
 
City A officials, when pressed for examples, indicated that some of the TIF 
money, which was, curiously, categorized in their annual report as a “health and 
human services” expenditure, in fact went to shore up some infrastructure that 
was threatening some firms due to recent flooding.   Still, in the case of City A, 
why were 27 percent of the current year TIF tax collections (plus beginning 
balance) carried forward (ostensibly as future year debt service payments) 
instead of certifying that need in the next fiscal year when the debt would be due?  
The city, by its own admission, is banking those TIF funds in anticipation of 
higher debt service costs in future years rather than levy those costs in the years 
that they are to be incurred. 
 
This short section was not designed to impugn either city, just to demonstrate 
that tracking down TIF spending from secondary sources is difficult and raises 
questions.  Analysts can choose any mix of Iowa cities and find peculiarities in 
their debt filing statements with the county auditors, 14 the amount of TIF debts 
that they claim in their own financial statements, and the actual uses for which 
                                                 
14 While not portrayed here, the gap between what City A officials certified as debt to the county auditor 
was roughly a third of the debt payments that were listed in their annual report.  In addition, the amount of 
TIF increment received by City A from the county auditor and subsequently declared by the city in its 
annual report differed markedly. 
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TIF funds were put.  This section is intended to demonstrate the potential for 
uncertainty in several areas, to include:  (1) the amount of TIF collections that 
might be reported by a community in light of actual collections, (2) the amounts 
spent in the name of economic development, (3) the specific uses to which funds 
were put, and (4) the reconciliation of those uses to the public.  If TIF revenues 
top $191,000,000 in Iowa, then the amount of money involved in these areas of 
uncertainty is immense. 
 
These are important issues that are properly addressed by legislators, auditors, 
the media, and others with an interest in the proper and appropriate uses of 
public resources in support of the economy and in support of government 
services in general.  There is a rapidly growing gap between the spirit of urban 
renewal legislation, written to enable and encourage TIF activity in specific and 
urban renewal in general, and the actual implementation of that legislation 
currently in Iowa in the name of economic development.  
 
Convention dictates the increment in TIF districts should be used for debt 
service, other kinds of payments to businesses and developers (usually in the 
form of tax rebates), or direct spending on infrastructure within the district.  TIF 
increments are generally thought improperly used when applied to, for example, 
general public buildings, fire stations, libraries, parks and other recreational 
spending, general community roadway or other basic community infrastructure, 
or broad general city government services.  Yet, there are many examples of TIF 
revenues in Iowa’s cities used for general fund, not economic development, 
purposes. 
 
There is a sentiment expressed by some city officials, however, that TIF revenues 
are considered acceptable funding sources for a broad range of city government 
activities, almost, it would seem, in defiance of the Iowa Code.  As a consequence, 
there are significant evolutions in language and actions that are, incrementally, 
being adopted among cities with TIF districts in Iowa.  These incremental 
changes appear to be considered more and more settled practice over time in that 
state and private auditors have not raised any red flags concerning them, to our 
knowledge, nor have state legislators addressed them head on.   
 
There very well may be an emerging TIF common law or convention that 
sequentially increases the application of TIF resources to a wider and wider 
variety of city government economic development and, arguably, non-economic 
development activities.  Remembering the earlier discussion where economic 
development is now defined as an essential municipal purpose, it is perhaps 
increasingly easy for communities to argue with all sincerity that nearly 
everything that they do has an economic development foundation.  One is left to 
wonder whether the restrictive language in the original and amended authority 
for TIFs in Iowa has become void because it is currently and widely clearly 
ignored by many cities. 
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TIF Usage in Iowa at the City Level 
 
Table 3 demonstrated that almost 95 percent of TIF revenues are collected by city 
governments in Iowa.  Not all cities exercise TIF authority, but nearly all cities of 
certain sizes or circumstances do.  The information in this section has been 
organized to highlight TIF usage by size and circumstances of Iowa cities.  The 
data are organized to characterize 
 
• Metropolitan cities – those with core populations of 50,000 or more 
persons 
• Metropolitan suburbs – cities in counties designated as metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSA) regardless of their size 
• Medium cities – cities not in MSA counties with populations ranging from 
2,500 to 49,999 
• Small cities – Iowa cities not in MSA counties with populations under 
2,500.  Nearly all of these communities are classified as rural communities 
by the U.S. Census. 
 
Properly classifying cities is important for any kind of analysis of change in Iowa.  
Over the years, metropolitan cities and their suburbs have realized population 
and commercial growth in excess of or, in many cases, to the exclusion of other 
cities in Iowa.  A very large number of the state’s smaller cities have experienced 
sharp population losses.  Identifying the average experiences over time among 
different sizes of cities helps us to understand how economic, fiscal, and 
population changes are occurring.  It also helps us to isolate the prevalence of TIF 
ordinance dependence in Iowa. 
 
Table 6 reveals some of the basic characteristics of Iowa’s cities in light of TIF 
ordinance use.   According to the data that we analyzed, there were 375 
communities utilizing TIF authority in fiscal 2006, or 40 percent of all 
communities.  One-hundred percent of the nine metropolitan cities employ TIF 
authority, followed by 97 percent of all medium sized cities.  The metropolitan 
suburban cities are next at 55 percent, followed by 26 percent of small cities.  We 
can see that TIF ordinance usage is much less prevalent for Iowa’s smaller cities, 
those under 2,500 in population.  Three-quarters forgo this economic 
development option, as do 45 percent of cities that are in MSA counties – mostly 
because they are very small communities or they are distant from the growing 
metropolitan core areas.15  Overall, TIF authority is used by 40 percent of Iowa 
communities.  In fiscal 1991, about 15 percent of cities utilized TIFs, so the rate of 
usage has nearly tripled over the intervening years. 
 
                                                 
15 Redefinition of metropolitan-influence counties in Iowa in the 2000 census expanded the number of the 
state’s metropolitan counties from 10 to 20 and extended the metro’s functional reach out into more rural 
areas. 
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Table 6 
Prevalence of TIF Usage by City Size, Fiscal 2006 
 
Number
Percent of 
Cities Number
Percent of 
Cities
Metropolitan cities 9 100% 0 0%
Metropolitan suburbs 127 55% 106 45%
Medium cities 76 97% 2 3%
Small cities 163 26% 465 74%
All Sizes 375 40% 573 60%
Cities with TIF Cities without TIF
 
 
 
Our primary comparison period for this study is fiscal 1997 to fiscal 2006 – a 
period where the dependence on TIFs increased and the dominant uses of TIF 
authority began to change.   Figure 7 demonstrates the change in dependence 
over that measurement period by identifying the percentage of city taxable 
valuation that is in TIF districts by city grouping.  In fiscal 2007, just over 5 
percent of city tax bases were in TIF districts.  By fiscal 2006, that percentage had 
grown to nearly 9 percent.  While all city groups realized gains, the largest are 
found in the metropolitan suburbs and in the small cities.  In both cases their 
percentages of tax base in TIF districts more than doubled to about 12.5 percent.   
This percentage represents the amount of city valuation that is available only for 
TIF uses and is excluded from use by the general funds of all local governments 
that otherwise would have taxing authority over those bases.16   
                                                 
16 It is often stated among city officials that “not all of that valuation is used by the city.”  The TIF 
valuation declared by the cities on their certified property tax collection forms, the amount reported in this 
study, is the amount of TIF valuation retained by the community not the amount that may have been 
released or is otherwise not utilized.  Portions of TIF districts that are released for general fund levies are 
reported as general fund taxable property values for that year.   If they’ve released it, it isn’t TIF. 
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Figure 7 
TIF Valuation as a Percentage of Total Valuation in TIF Cities, 
Fiscal Year 1997 and 2006
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Table 7 compares the experiences of cities using three different measures of 
change over time, including TIF taxable valuation change.  For the period 
measured we have identified population change, TIF taxable valuation change, 
and total taxable valuation change by city category.  Right off, it is apparent that 
population growth has disproportionately accumulated to Iowa’s metropolitan 
suburbs.  We estimate those communities realized 88 percent of the population 
change occurring in the state between fiscal 1997 and 2006 (calendar years 1995 
through 2004).17  Iowa’s metropolitan cities realized 20 percent of population 
growth.  Together, the metropolitan core and suburb cities accounted for 108 
percent of all population change.  Iowa’s medium cities declined by 8 percent and 
its small cities did not grow. 
 
When we look at the categorical relationship between TIF change and population 
change, no clear pattern emerges.  The suburbs accumulated 56 percent of all TIF 
valuation growth and 88 percent of population growth in TIF cities.  Their 
percentage change in people far exceeded their percentage change in TIF.  In the 
medium cities, their accumulation of 16 percent of TIF valuation growth failed to 
coincide with population gains – they experienced population loss instead.  
Metro cities accumulated of 18 percent of TIF growth, compared to 20 percent of 
the population growth.  Lastly, we need to look at how total taxable valuation is 
growing.  Among the metropolitan cities and suburbs, their shares of total 
                                                 
17 Taxable valuations in Iowa are determined as of January 1 or an assessment year.  Those assessments are 
then applied to the next fiscal year.  For example, calendar year 2000 taxable valuations are applied to the 
fiscal 2002 period, the next fiscal year after which the assessments were made. 
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valuation growth exceeded their shares of TIF growth.  Conversely, among the 
medium and small cities, their shares of TIF valuation growth far exceeded their 
shares of total valuation growth. 
 
Table 7 
Shares of Total Changes by City Group for  
Cities with TIF Ordinances 
 
Shares of Total Change Population 
Change TIF Change
Total 
Valuation 
Change
Metropolitan City 20% 18% 30%
Metropolitan Suburbs 88% 56% 59%
Medium City -8% 16% 5%
Small City 0% 9% 5%
All TIF Cities 100% 100% 100%
Cities With TIF
 
 
 
Another way to portray the change in TIF valuation as it relates to the total 
change in urban valuation is found in Figure 8.  For all cities with TIF ordinances, 
TIF valuations were 29 percent of total urban taxable valuation growth.  By city 
size, the lowest fractions are found in the metropolitan core and suburban cities 
where TIF accumulations were 17 percent and 27 percent, respectively, of total 
growth.  A much different picture is demonstrated for the medium and the 
smaller cities.  For the medium cites, 88 percent of their taxable valuation growth 
occurred in TIF districts, and is therefore not available to contribute to other 
local governments’ general fund in those communities.  In the small cities, the 
TIF portion was 52 percent.  If we conclude that total taxable valuation change 
and total population gains are related to growth in TIF amounts and TIF efforts, 
the evidence is very clear that TIF accumulations are much more beneficial to 
metropolitan cities and suburbs: they are realizing all net population growth and 
their TIF growth is a much lower percentage of total valuation than smaller cities. 
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Figure 8 
TIF Values as Percentages of Total Taxable Value 
Growth for Cities, Fiscal 1997 to 2006
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Another perhaps more telling comparison is found in Figure 9.  Here we 
standardize the accumulations of regular and TIF valuation by the total 
population of each city group.  Among all TIF cities, the average growth in real 
(adjusted for inflation) valuation per person was $3,503, with $1,306 of this 
growth occurring in TIF districts.   
• On average, Iowa’s metropolitan core cities added $3,042 in real total 
valuation per capita.  TIF valuation growth accounted for $614 of this total. 
• Iowa’s suburban cities experienced $6,063 in total valuation growth per 
capita, including $2,700 per person in TIF growth.  The per person “yield” in 
TIF growth was more than four times that for the metro core cities and more 
than twice the average, statewide per person rate.   
• The real change for the medium cities was $1,244 in total valuation per capita.  
Their TIF valuation growth of $826 per capita was a third less than the state 
average and a full 70 percent less than the suburban cities.   
• On a per capita basis, the small cities did better than the medium cities, with 
growth of $3,050 in total valuation and $1,587 in TIF accumulations per 
capita.  Their real per capita TIF growth was 20 percent higher than the state 
average and roughly 40 percent below the suburban city rate. 
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Figure 9 
Real Change in City Valuations Per Capita, Fiscal 1997-2006
3,042
6,063
1,244
3,050
3,503
Real Changes ($)
Regular valuation per capita  2,428  3,364  417  1,463  2,197 
TIF valuation per capita  614  2,699  826  1,587  1,306 
Total valuation per capita  3,042  6,063  1,244  3,050  3,503 
Metropolitan 
cities
Metropolitan 
suburbs Medium cities Small cities All TIF cities
 
The question of causality inevitably enters the discussion at this stage.  TIF 
proponents argue that TIF effort is highly instrumental in producing desirable 
community-wide outcomes at the municipal level, both economically and 
demographically – that without TIF ordinances, the total accumulations that are 
listed would not have otherwise occurred.   This is what is called the “but-for” 
criterion.   Others might counter that it is very hard to sort out the effects of TIF 
as a tool of development from overall and over-riding urbanization influences 
that have been slowly transforming demography, capital investment, and the 
economy of the state, irrespective of development incentives at the local or state 
levels.   
 
Traditional urban economics would conclude that much of the growth 
accumulating to metropolitan areas would very likely have occurred with or 
without incentives.  Others might counter that much of the vaunted insurance 
and finance company growth, for example, in the Des Moines downtown area 
would not have happened without aggressive tax and development incentives 
despite the fact that the area is known nationally for its concentration of 
insurance and financial firms.  And, it is quite evident that the very aggressive use 
of TIF authority among the state’s medium and small cities is not resulting in 
population growth.  If, indeed, the vitality of rural areas is the maintenance of 
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their population bases, then there is no systematic evidence that TIF ordinances 
are effective in overcoming their losses.18 
 
These issues cannot be resolved given the gradual evolution of TIF uses in Iowa 
and the paucity of specific data necessary to compare different types of growth in 
Iowa considering the different TIF uses over time.  Still, TIF proponents, Iowa’s 
city officials and economic development specialists, primarily, are often quick to 
note that TIF is the primary tool of economic development in the state.  The 
problem with that claim, however, is that TIFs are relegated to be both the cause 
and the effect: had we not offered TIF incentives the firm wouldn’t have located 
in our community; now that the firm located in our community, the TIF 
increment demonstrates our success.  But as our data suggest, the outcomes are 
quite different among different kinds of communities, and we can go back and 
use Figure 9 to ascertain some nominal efficiencies in the existing system and the 
changes that have accumulated over the past nine fiscal periods. 
 
On the average, the metropolitan core cities were able to realize $2,428 in regular 
valuation from roughly a quarter as much TIF effort.  In contrast, the suburban 
cities, while yielding much more in total valuation change realized a dollar’s 
worth of regular valuation for every $.80 of TIF valuation.  If we measure TIF 
success broadly as the ratio of TIF to real regular valuation growth, metropolitan 
uses are much more efficient on a taxable valuation basis than suburban.   For the 
medium cities, nearly $2 of TIF valuation accumulation was needed before a 
dollar’s worth of regular valuation was gained and available for local 
governments’ general funds.  For the smallest cities, $1.08 of TIF gain compared 
to $1.00 of gain in the regular tax base.  By these comparisons, the best regular 
valuation outcome compared to TIF outcomes occurs at the metropolitan level 
and by far the worse at the medium city (10,000 to 49,000) level.   
 
On a net real receipts per capita basis, no matter the efficiency considerations, 
metropolitan area gains far outstrip gains in non-metropolitan regions.  If we 
measure success simply by the accumulation of population, then, by far, the 
suburban cities performed the best as they accumulated 88 percent of the 
population changes accruing in Iowa, compared to their 56 percent share of TIF 
valuation change.  Their population yield exceeded the metro core cities strongly; 
the population yield in the medium cities was negative, and in the small cities 
zero. 
 
 
                                                 
18 There is also the often claimed response: “but we would have declined much more had it not been for our 
economic development efforts.”   That is a response that, obviously, cannot be measured because we do not 
conduct systematic controlled experiments on community change over time given community 
characteristics and the presence of TIF ordinances.  Of the cities without TIF ordinances, 75 percent are 
very small and, by virtue of their circumstances and historical change, have ruled the ordinance out as a 
potential effective tool for local growth. 
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Individual City Comparisons 
 
Table 8 identifies the top cities in Iowa realizing gains in real (adjusted for 
inflation) TIF valuations between fiscal 1997 and 2006.  The cities listed in the 
table account for 75 percent of the cumulative gains statewide in TIF valuation 
among all cities with the ordinance.  These cities are ranked from highest to 
lowest by real TIF valuation gains.  The table also shows the cities’ regular taxable 
valuations and total valuations.  Last, we compare these top 31 cities to all other 
TIF cities and non-TIF cities in terms of real TIF growth. 
 
Over the nine fiscal years assessed, the city of Des Moines posted $297.4 million 
in real TIF valuation growth, followed by Coralville, a city less than a 10th the size 
of Des Moines, with $296 million in real TIF valuation growth, and West Des 
Moines with $197.4 million.  Collectively the top 31 cities account for $2.237 
billion (75 percent) in real TIF valuation growth; the remaining 344 cities with 
TIF authority shared the remaining $727.1 million in statewide TIF valuation 
growth.  Half of the TIF valuation growth in Iowa was found in just the top 11 
cities.  
 
When we compare real TIF valuation change with all taxable valuation change we 
can see wide variations.  TIF accounted for 62 percent of all real valuation growth 
in Des Moines over the measurement period, and 69 percent of the growth in 
Coralville, compared to 26 percent for West Des Moines.19  The average for the 
top 31 cities was 38 percent.  For the remaining 344 cities, the average amount of 
total valuation change in TIF was 17 percent, less than half the fraction realized 
by the top 31 cities.  The statistically beneficial outcomes associated with TIF 
valuation accumulations are highly concentrated in only a few Iowa cities. 
 
We also see that nine of these top 31 cities, while posting the stronger gains in 
TIF valuations over this period also realized inflation adjusted declines in the 
value of all regular taxable valuation, the valuation that is available for use by the 
general funds of all local governments in those jurisdictions.  The real decline in 
this category was most pronounced in Burlington at $56.3 million and then in 
Marshalltown at $24.9 million.  For all TIF cities in Iowa, 120 had positive TIF 
valuation gains yet reductions in regular taxable valuations.  An additional 13 TIF 
cities had both real reductions in TIF valuations and real reductions to regular 
valuations. 
 
                                                 
19 That comparatively higher amount of TIF growth as a percentage of all valuation growth for the city of 
Des Moines stands out in stark contrast to the average statistics demonstrated in Figure 3 where the 
metropolitan average was 17 percent. 
 
 32
Table 8 
Real Changes in Property Valuations,  
Fiscal 1997 to 2006, Ranked by TIF 
 
Regular Taxable 
Valuation TIF Valuation
Cumulative 
Percent of 
All TIF
All Taxable 
Valuation
Des Moines 181,415,723     297,471,094     10% 478,886,817       
Coralville 132,784,003     296,026,484     21% 428,810,488       
West Des Moines 559,856,628     197,337,027     28% 757,193,654       
Cedar Falls 260,597,598     116,677,939     32% 377,275,537       
Altoona 132,489,855     112,304,586     36% 244,794,441       
Cedar Rapids 218,354,167     91,181,515       39% 309,535,682       
Urbandale 488,026,075     84,488,168       42% 572,514,243       
Dubuque 118,597,246     83,105,504       45% 201,702,750       
Clive 211,928,870     67,005,233       47% 278,934,103       
Johnston 318,716,683     62,005,381       49% 380,722,064       
Spirit Lake (2,187,367)       60,536,509       51% 58,349,141         
Pleasant Hill 57,594,917       59,377,329       53% 116,972,247       
Bettendorf 169,355,934     54,567,341       55% 223,923,275       
Pella 6,761,252         52,221,559       57% 58,982,811         
Le Mars (4,304,664)       48,032,321       59% 43,727,657         
Ankeny 477,492,698     44,756,103       60% 522,248,801       
Waterloo 195,103,378     40,957,981       62% 236,061,358       
Waukee 127,431,391     36,716,545       63% 164,147,936       
West Burlington (5,827,454)       35,496,364       64% 29,668,911         
Iowa Falls (16,225,385)     30,308,024       65% 14,082,640         
Le Claire 9,736,366         28,806,211       66% 38,542,577         
Marshalltown (24,857,927)     28,759,446       67% 3,901,519           
Burlington (56,252,466)     27,127,734       68% (29,124,732)        
Asbury 13,230,250       26,730,158       69% 39,960,408         
Norwalk 38,069,019       23,563,145       70% 61,632,164         
Sheldon (16,747,360)     23,045,831       71% 6,298,471           
Tiffin 3,511,387         22,125,117       72% 25,636,504         
Nevada (6,656,441)       21,951,224       72% 15,294,783         
Windsor Heights 651,578            21,743,432       73% 22,395,010         
Harlan (8,458,383)       21,735,315       74% 13,276,932         
Muscatine (20,784,455)     21,148,475       75% 364,020              
Subtotal Top 31 
Cities 3,559,403,118 2,137,309,094 75% 5,696,712,212   
All Other TIF Cities: 
N = 344 3,602,122,536 727,088,907    25% 4,329,211,444   
Total TIF Cities 7,161,525,655 2,864,398,001 100% 10,025,923,656 
All non-TIF Cities: 
N=573 117,785,909    N/A N/A 117,785,909      
All Cities: N = 948 7,279,311,563  2,864,398,001  100% 10,143,709,565   
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Twelve of the communities in the top 31 of real TIF accumulations are located in 
the Polk, Warren, and Dallas County metropolitan region.  Combined, these 10 
communities account for 35 percent of statewide real TIF growth.  This 
underscores the fact that TIF valuation gains are highly concentrated 
geographically, in this case in central Iowa.  They are also highly concentrated 
among metropolitan counties.  Combined, all metropolitan county communities 
(central cities and suburbs) accumulated 74 percent of all real TIF growth over 
the period measured. 
 
Last, there are 573 communities, 60 percent, in Iowa that do not or cannot use 
TIF authority.  These communities’ total real taxable valuation gains were $117.8 
million.  Stated differently, 60 percent of Iowa’s communities realized only 1.2 
percent of the real, statewide growth in total taxable valuation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Tax Increment Finance districts are a large and rapidly growing component of 
Iowa’s economic development infrastructure and its property tax base.  This 
report shows that the amount of valuation contained within TIF districts is, in the 
current fiscal year, nearly $6 billion dollars and yielded over $191 million in 
property taxes that were used in the name of promoting economic growth and 
redevelopment among Iowa’s cities and counties. 
 
More than a quarter of the state’s recent real tax base growth has been 
sequestered in TIF districts.  Of that TIF growth, three-quarters have 
accumulated to the state’s metropolitan counties, with the remaining 25 percent 
of TIF value growth shared among the 79 other counties.  TIF success, as in 
realizing robust gains in area increments, is highly localized in and around the 
state’s metropolitan counties, with much more meager, and in some cases 
negative, outcomes posted among most of Iowa’s more rural and remote areas. 
 
It is very hard to demonstrate that TIF usage has, on the whole, benefited the 
state of Iowa in any uniform manner.  Our data show that three-quarters of all of 
the valuation gains in TIF districts in Iowa are concentrated in just 31 cities (and 
half of the growth in a mere 11 cities).  Among those top 31 cities, some are 
enjoying booming job and population growth, but some are not.  Some of are 
expanding their total tax bases, and some of them are contracting despite their 
aggressive use of TIFs.  For some it is enhancing fortunes, and in others it is not 
reversing long and pervasive patterns of business and population decline.  None 
of our data can sort out what growth would have occurred in growing areas 
regardless of the use of TIF incentives, nor can it tell us what growth would have 
left had TIF resources not been utilized. 
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Many of Iowa’s small to medium sized cities and, lately, counties have 
aggressively deployed TIF authority, yet the return on their effort is small 
compared to the much more lucrative use of TIF authority in metropolitan areas.   
 
Here is a common scenario about TIF usage in Iowa’s smaller cities:  Usually, TIF 
authority is applied to areas of communities that are near the edge of town or 
aligned with other growth areas of the community, say along a major state 
highway – their economic development zones or districts.  Frequently, much if 
not all of the incremental growth in these communities is a relocation of growth 
from deteriorating main-street areas out to the benefited zones.  As a 
consequence, the TIF district gains, the general tax base shrinks, and the re-
locating firm gets a tax break.  The cities claim they retained the businesses and 
count this as an economic development success, but city, school, and county 
general fund tax rates go up to cover costs no longer borne by the re-located firm.  
Regionally there has been no job or income growth as a result. 
 
From conversations with county auditors and others privy to city and county 
government activities regarding TIF usage, there are also increasing reports that 
TIF revenues in Iowa are a lucrative revenue stream for cities that they are loathe 
to cede back to other local governments.  There are also reports that TIF 
revenues, according to the Iowa Code, supposed to be collected and used 
specifically for economic development or urban renewal debt payments and 
infrastructure enhancements are being used to pay for fire stations, libraries, 
parks and recreation facilities, general road repair and maintenance, and hosts of 
other general or traditional government uses.  
 
Whether these uses are abuses or the legitimate exercise of TIF authority is the 
province of the Iowa General Assembly and the state auditors who monitor local 
government spending.  It is also the province of citizens.  But as the profile of our 
two cities demonstrated, it is not easy to figure out from a city’s annual report 
precisely how much TIF revenue they may have collected, how they were used, 
and whether those uses, in and of themselves, were proper uses.   
 
In the next fiscal year more than $200 million will be collected in Iowa TIF 
districts.  According to our tables, the average Iowa city using TIF revenues for 
economic development purposes will give up $1 in potential general fund receipts 
for every $2 in TIF receipts that it gets from other local governments as a result.  
And that, our research suggests, is the only consistent return on investment most 
of Iowa’s cities are realizing from TIF.  The net returns to the economy, to the 
state’s taxpayers, and to good government are yet to be determined. 
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